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I cannot join the Court on what amounts to a slash-and-burn
expedition through the law of environmental standing.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Standing is a justiciability doctrine designed to control access to
federal courts and determine who is entitled to have a case adjudicated in
the federal court system.2 Standing is an important doctrine because a
court can use it to dictate minority or majority access to the federal judicial
system.3 Originating in Article III of the United States Constitution, the
standing doctrine limits judicial power to "cases" and "controversies.""
* The authors wish to thank Professor Larry M. Elison and Assistant Professor Sharon K. Snyder
for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2160 (1992) (Blackmun. J., dissenting).
2. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83. 94-95 (1968).
3. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881-82 (1983); Michael A. Perino, Comment, Justice Scalia:
Standing. Environmental Law and the Supreme Court, 15 B. C. ENvrL L. REV. 135. 150 (1987);
Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions. 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265, 1267
(1961). For Justice Scalia, standing appropriately restricts courts from meddling with political
processes and protecting the minority from the tyranny of the majority. Scalia, supra. at 881-83.
However, pragmatically, executive agencies have grown in power and size and do not always represent
the majority through traditional political processes. The courts seem to be the appropriate entity to
adjudicate these minority versus minority interests.
4. Article I1l, section 2 states in part that:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
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However, the Constitution does not articulate the breadth of the "cases"
and "controversies" language. Consequently, courts have turned to his-
tory, court priorities, and case law in defining standing.' The touchstone of
standing in the federal system has become whether a plaintiff has a
personal stake in the outcome of a controversy, placing primary concern on
the party bringing the action and secondary concern on the issues brought
before the court.'
Courts approach standing in two ways. The first approach focuses on
the constitutional requirements that courts have placed on standing. The
second approach focuses on the prudential restrictions that courts use to
deny standing, preserve judicial credibility, or defer to agency actions.7
Courts often commingle and confuse the two approaches, openly acknowl-
edging that they are not easily defined.'
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States; [between
a State and Citizens of another state;-] between Citizens of different States-between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, [and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.]
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make....
U.S. CON T. art. II1, § 2.
5. However, the history and tradition of standing has varied wildly. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe. 484
U.S. 305, 340 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (conceding that the words "cases" and "controversies"
"have virtually no meaning"); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,475 (1982) (admitting that "the concept of'Art. III standing' has
not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases by this Court which have discussed
it"); Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1513 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing past
application of the standing doctrine as "tangled and fluctuating formulations"). Yet in Allen, the
Supreme Court stated: "The absence of precise definitions.., hardly leaves courts at sea in applying the
law of standing. Like most legal notions, the standing concepts have gained considerable definition
from developing case law." 468 U.S. at 751 (citation omitted). Moreover, Raoul Berger and Professor
Louis Jaffe find that history and tradition do not necessarily support the interpretation of "cases" and
"controversies" as it stands now, but in fact support a far broader interpretation. Evan Tsen Lee,
Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REv. 603, 638-39
(1992); Raoiul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78
YALE L.J. 816, 819-27 (1969); Jaffe, supra note 3, at 1267.
6. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 731-32; Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The
Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1380 (1973). Standing should not be a factual question, nor should
it involve the merits of a claim; it should only determine if the proper party is bringing a claim that
passes the threshold requirements for federal judicial review. Flast, 392 U.S. at 100.
7. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471.
8. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (describing both approaches as "incorporat[ing] concepts
concededly not susceptible of precise definition"); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970) (stating that "[gleneralizations about standing tosue are largely worthless as
such"); Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 (noting that "standing has been called one of 'the most amorphous
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Standing presents a significant hurdle to organizational plaintiffs in
environmental litigation that must assert harm to their members resulting
from harm to the environment. For several reasons, the Ninth Circuit is a
hotbed of environmental litigation, second only to the District of Columbia
Circuit.9 The Ninth Circuit has interpreted standing requirements liber-
ally.' 0 To comport with recent United States Supreme Court decisions,
however, the Ninth Circuit has curtailed its liberal stance when consider-
ing constitutional requirements or reviewing prudential restrictions for
environmental organizations.
This Article analyzes both the constitutional requirements and the
prudential restrictions on standing, including their component parts. The
Article follows the application of each component by the United States
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court. Within this discussion, the
Article suggests how environmental organizations might avoid the pitfalls
that have cost them standing in the past."1
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The approach to standing based on judicial interpretation of the
[concepts] in the entire domain of public land law' ). The confusion is only furthered when courts
blend discussions of standing and ripeness, as cases often raise both issues. Moreover, courts may
overlap their analysis of the doctrines of standing and ripeness because the tests for the doctrines
overlap. See Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2140-47; Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 915
n.16 (1990); Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 789 F. Supp. 1529, 1534 (D. Mont. 1991). Both
doctrines determine the ultimate question of whether the merits of the case should even be decided by
the federal court; however, they raise different issues and should be analyzed separately. See Kenneth
E. Scott, Standingin theSupreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REv. 645,684 (1973).
9. First, the sheer size of the Ninth Circuit renders it significant in the environmental context. It
encompasses nine western states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon,
Washington, and Hawaii). Second, federal public lands are heavily concentrated in these states,
especially Alaska, which has one-half of all public lands; additionally, "the United States retains
reserved mineral interests under some 60 million acres in the west." GEORGE CM.-IERON COGGINS &
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND REsoURcEs LAW 2 (1981). Third, the very
nature of the region's industries, such as timber, ranching, and mining, breeds conflict with
environmental concerns. The District of Columbia plays a significant role because Congress has given it
exclusivejurisdiction over EPA rule-making decisions under many environmental statutes. See Karen
M. Wardzinski, The Doctrine of Standing. Barriers to Judicial Review In the D.C. Circuit.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW MANUAL 50, 50 (Theodore L. Garrett ed., 1992).
10. See Pacific Legal Found. v. Watt, 703 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1983) ("imposing a relatively low
threshold with respect to environmental litigation in general and the Endangered Species Act in
particular"); Susan L. Gordon, The Ninth Circuit Standing Requirements for Environmental
Organizations, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 264.270 (1993); George K. Pash. NEPA
As Procedure It Stands, As Procedure It Falls: Standing & Substantive Review in Idaho Conservation
League v. Mumma, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 365 (1993).
11. For helpful insights on drafting affidavits, see James M. McElfish. Jr., Drafting Standing
Affidavits after Defenders: In the Court's Own Words, 23 [News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,026 (1993).
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constitutional requirements has three components.12 First, a plaintiff must
suffer an injury in fact, ensuring that the plaintiff suffers an imminent and
not merely conjectural harm.'3 Second, the defendant's action must have
caused the harm, ensuring that the harm is not the result of an independent
or third-party action. 4 Third, the relief requested must redress the harm,
ensuring that the court has the ability to remedy the problem.' While
these components seem straightforward, there is no rhyme and little reason
to the haphazard application of the constitutional requirements by both the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit.
A. Injury in Fact
Injury in fact is the threshold component of the constitutional
requirements.' 6 The injury in fact component ensures that a party has
suffered an injury to a personal and cognizable interest that warrants
judicial intervention. 17 In other words, the injury must be (1) concrete and
particularized,' 8 and (2) actual or imminent. 19 A merely conjectural or
12. The United States Supreme Court interpreted the constitutional requirements as the
"'irreducible minimum" that a plaintiff must establish to have standing. Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,472 (1982); see also Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (requiring that a plaintiff "allege [1] personal injury [2] fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and [3] likely to be redressed by the requested
relief"); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972).
13. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
14. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
15. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
16. Whether a case involves statutory review or non-statutory review under the APA, a plaintiff
must establish injury in fact. Scott, supra note 8, at 654. Some statutes provide for judicial review
within their language. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 491 l(b)(l)(A) (1988); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988); Deepwater Ports
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1988); Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1988). For example, the Clean Air Act provides
for citizen suits whereby any person may seek injunctive relief to enforce the provisions of the Act. 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988). However, many statutes do not specifically provide forjudicial review within
their language, requiring plaintiffs to turn to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to gain judicial
review of a defendant agency's actions. See generally National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321-33 (1988); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (l)(a) (1988). In Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, the Court found that
section 702 of the APA, read in conjunction with section 704, creates a "basic presumption of judicial
review" for qualified plaintiffs. 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). Section 702 of the APA provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.
5 U.S.C. § 702. For a good overview of injury in fact, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, American
Constitutional Law, §§ 3-15 to -17 (2d ed. 1988).
17. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 732,734-35. The injury in fact test is very similar to the imminent or
actual requirement of ripeness, often causing confusion between the two standards. See Defenders, 112
S. Ct. at 2136-37; Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 915 n.16 (1990).
18. See Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2136; Allen, 468 U.S. at 756; Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 740-41
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hypothetical injury does not confer standing.20
Traditionally, a plaintiff had to allege injury to an economic interest
or a property right to establish standing.21 In 1970, the Supreme Court
lowered the hurdles for environmental groups by holding that non-
economic injuries could satisfy the injury in fact component. 22 The Court
recognized that injury to " 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as
well as economic values" could qualify as injury in fact.2" In 1972, the
Supreme Court again lowered those hurdles, when in Sierra Club v.
Morton, it stated:
Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic
well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our
society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are
shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less
deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.2'
However, the Court still required more than an injury to a cognizable
interest; it required a particularized and personal-stake injury.25
In 1973, the Supreme Court lowered the hurdles of standing even
further, to an extent not likely to be followed. 26 In United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), the
plaintiffs alleged that a railroad surcharge would discourage the use of
n.16 (discussing Alexis deToqueville's observation "thatjudicial review is cffective largely because it is
not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to remedy a particular
concrete injury").
19. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
20. See Cityof Los Angelesv. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,101-02 (1983) (finding that thealleged injury
may not be abstract, hypothetical, or conjectural). In Allen. the Court found that the if the alleged
harm is "distinct and palpable... and not 4abstract' or 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical'." the injury in fact
component would be met. 468 U.S. at 751. For a discussion of the nexus requirement, see infra Part IV.
21. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 733-34 (citing Barlow v. Collins. 397 US. 159 (1970)).
22. Association of Data Processing Servs. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150. 152 (1970).
23. Id. at 153 (emphasizing that standing may stem from noneconomic values as well as from
economic injury on which petitioners relied).
24. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734; see also National Wildlife Fed'n. 497 U.S. at 3187.
25. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735. The majority denied the Sierra Club standing because it
"failed to allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the
Disney development." Id. Dissenting Justice Douglas, whom Justice Blackmun joined, suggested
fashioning a federal rule that allows environmental issues to be litigated in the name of the inanimate
object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded. Id. at 741. Justice Douglas believed the problem to be
not one of judicial interference but of assuring that nature will not be destroyed before being
considered. Id. at 752. Justice Douglas used John Dunne in his dissenting opinion to warn the majority
that the law should not be so rigid and inflexible so as to preclude review of ecological disturbances and
the deteriorating environment. Id. at 760. See also Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing?-Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL L. REv. 45. 89 (1972).
26. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP). 412 U.S.
669 (1973). The plaintiffs claimed that an increased rate on recycled goods injured their recreational.
economic, and aesthetic interests. The plaintiffs supported their allegations with specific affidavits
stating that they used the affected areas. Id. at 675-76.
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"recyclable" materials and adversely affect the environment by encourag-
ing unwarranted use of raw materials.27 The Court held that the allega-
tions were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss and distinguished
Sierra Club because the SCRAP plaintiffs' affidavits showed harm to
individual members of the organizations.2 8 In 1975, the Court ensured that
"[t]he actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by
virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing.' "29
In 1990, in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,"0 the Court started
to curtail its previously broad interpretation of standing. Specifically, it
clarified the technicalities needed in an affidavit to establish injury in
fact."1 In National Wildlife Federation, the Supreme Court denied
standing to the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) for failing to
establish injury in fact.32 NWF challenged the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment's (BLM) land withdrawal program that opened public lands to
mineral exploration, 33 claiming violations of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA), the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).34
The Court did not follow a tripartite constitutional approach to
standing. Instead, it focused on statutory requirements, specifically
NWF's right to relief under section 702 of the APA. 3 The court found that
27. Id. at 676.
28. Id. at 687.
29. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). Dissenting Justice Douglas touched on the
problems of strict standing requirements. He thought that the Court read the complaint and record
with antagonistic eyes, stating "There are in the background of this case continuing strong tides of
opinion touching on very sensitive matters, some of which involve race, some distinctions on wealth."
Id. at 518. Therefore, the court used standing as "a barrier to access to the federal courts, just as the
.political question' was in earlier decades." Id. at 519.
30. 497 U.S. 871 (5-4 decision). Scalia, J. wrote for the majority, in which Rehnquist, White.
O'Connor, and Kennedy, J.J., joined. Blackmun, J. filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan,
Marshall and Stevens, J.J., joined. The district court granted Defenders' motion for preliminary
injunctive relief and denied the government's motion to dismiss on the basis of standing. The First
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed both orders. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (Ist
Cir. 1987). On remand, the district court granted the government's Rule 56 motion to dismiss.
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988). The Court of Appeals reversed.
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
31. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 889. The Supreme Court also examined the issue of
ripeness in National Wildlife Fed'n, although neither the lower court nor the parties addressed the
issue. Id. at 890-94, 915 n.16.
32. Id. at 889.
33. Id. at 879. NWF sought to invalidate many of the withdrawal revocations made by the BLM
from 1981 to 1985. Id.
34. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969)). FLPMA directs the
Secretary of the Interior to inventory public lands, classifying them for their proper use. 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1711(a), 1712(d) (1988).
35. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 882.
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NWF had to satisfy two requirements under the APA: first, it had to be
affected by a final agency action; and second, it had to be adversely affected
or aggrieved by the agency action within the meaning of the relevant
statutes, FLPMA and NEPA.36 The Court applied the first APA require-
ment as the injury in fact component of the constitutional requirements
and applied the second test as the zone of interests component of the
prudential restrictions. The Court found that the affidavits established
adverse effects or aggrievement to recreational and aesthetic interests, and
therefore the affidavits established harm within the meaning of the
relevant statutes. Because National Wildlife Federation involved a motion
for summary judgment, the Court required a more stringent showing of
fact than it requires to survive a motion to dismiss, thereby distinguishing
SCRAP's broad holding, which was based on a motion to dismiss. 37
NWF's affidavits failed to establish that the members were affected
by an agency action.3 8 They lacked sufficient specificity to meet the injury
in fact component because the affidavits merely alleged use of land "in the
vicinity" of certain BLM land withdrawal projects.3 9 The Court held that a
party must allege with specificity a concrete injury to a particular resource
in a particular area enjoyed and used by members of the organization.'0 In
addition, the Court held that to establish an actual or imminent threat, a
party must show individualized harm to a member's use of the location
caused by the impact of the final agency action.
In dissent, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
rejected the majority's strict interpretation of injury in fact.42 They
believed that the question was not whether NWF proved standing to bring
its action, but whether there was a genuine issue for trial concerning
36. Id.
37. Id. at 888-89.
38. Id. at 887.
39. For example, the Peterson affidavit averred:
My recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands, particularly those in the
vicinity of South Pass-Green Mountain, Wyoming have been and continue to be adversely
affected in fact by the unlawful actionsof the Bureau and the Department. In particular, the
South Pass-Green Mountain area of Wyoming has been opened to the staking of mining
claims and oil and gas leasing, an action which threatens the aesthetic beauty and wildlife
habitat potential of these lands.
Id. at 886.
40. For example, the Peterson affidavit failed to show that the plaintiffs' recreational use and
enjoyment extended to the particular 4,500 acres covered by the decision. Id. at 887. "At a minimum.
the [plaintiff] is ambiguous regarding whether the adversely affected lands are the ones she uses ." Id.
at 888.
41. Id. at 889. National Wildlife Fed'n appeared to limit injuries contingent on subsequent third
party actions. See Gordon, supra note 10, at 269.
42. National Wildlife Fedn, 497 U.S. at 900-01.
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NWF's standing.43 The dissent argued that the affidavits were "sufficiently
precise to enable [BLM] officials to identify the particular termination
orders to which the affiants referred," and that they presented adequate
evidence to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Moreover, the
dissent stated that if the BLM did not administer the land withdrawal
program in accordance with the law, NWF should be able to challenge the
BLM program.4 5 In summary, National Wildlife Federation illustrates
the split on the Court and the heightened specificity needed for injury in
fact.
Four months before National Wildlife Federation, the Ninth Circuit
decided People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Depart-
ment of Health & Human Services.4" In PETA, the Ninth Circuit
parallelled the Supreme Court's reasoning in National Wildlife Federa-
tion, granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denying
the plaintiffs' standing. The plaintiffs sued several federal agencies,
alleging that funding granted to institutions in the San Francisco area
without preparation of Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) adversely
affected their use of the Bay area for recreation, aesthetic, quality of life,
and health purposes.47
Since PETA involved a motion for summary judgment as did
National Wildlife Federation, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the broad view
of standing enunciated in SCRAP on the grounds that SCRAP involved a
motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss "presumes that general allegations
embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim[,]"
whereas a motion for summary judgment entails no such presumption.48
The court found that the plaintiffs' generalized affidavits might have
defeated a motion to dismiss but not a motion for summary judgment.49
The Ninth Circuit followed National Wildlife Federation's injury in fact
analysis, requiring PETA to file affidavits alleging specific facts and
43. Id. at 903. The dissent stated that -[t] he Peterson and Erman affidavits doubtless could have
been more artfully drafted, but they were definitely sufficient to withstand the federal parties' summary
judgment motion." Id. at 904.
44. Id. at 902.
45. Id. at 913-14.
46. 917 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1990).
47. PETA, 917 F.2d at 16. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary
judgment in the agencies' favor based on the plaintiffs' failure to allege specific facts that demonstrated
their use had been or would be injured by the funding granted. Id. at 17.
48. Id. (quoting National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 889).
49. Id. The court intimated that it took exception to the lack of specificity found in the plaintiffs'
form declarations when it stated: "Six of these declarations contain identical language which asserts
very generally that the declarant is aware that .... and conceivably used the procedural difference
between a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment to impose a stricter interpretation of
injury in fact. Id. at 16.
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detailing their use of specific areas within a larger geographic area."0
The Ninth Circuit applied National Wildlife Federation's approach
to injury in fact to reach a iifferent holding in Idaho Conservation League
v. Mumma.5 1 In Idaho Conservation League, the Idaho Conservation
League (ICL) challenged the Forest Service's decision to recommend
against wilderness designations in forty-three of the forty-seven roadless
areas of the Idaho Panhandle National Forests, claiming violations of the
APA, NEPA, and National Forest Management Act (N FMA).8 2 ICL also
claimed that the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to examine the
Land and Resource Management Plan's (LRMP) full environmental
effects,5s thus, sacrificing roadless areas without considering all available
alternatives.5 4
The Ninth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's analysis of injury in
fact, applying the APA's two requirements for judicial review.88 The court
looked to NEPA's statutory language to define the injury. 6 Because
"NEPA is essentially a procedural statute designed to ensure that
environmental issues are given proper consideration in the decisionmaking
process," the court found that an injury resulting from the violation of this
procedural right conferred standing.5 7 The court diverged from National
50. Id. at 17.
51. 956 F.2d 1508, 1517 (9th Cir. 1992); see National Wildlife Fed'n. 497 US. at 882.
52. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1510. N FMA directs the Secretary of the Interior
to "develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land and resource management plans [LRMPJ for
units of the National Forest System." Id. at 1515 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a)). In developing an
LRMP, the Secretary must "include coordination of outdoor recreation. range timber, watershed.
wildlife and fish, and wilderness" Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)). During this process, the Secretary
must recommend primitive areas to Congress for wilderness designation. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C.
§ 1131(a)).
53. Id. at 1513. In compliance with NEPA, Final Environmental Impact Statements (FEIS)
must accompany the LRMP's NEPA analysis. Id. at 1511 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1)). The
Forest Service must also conduct a N EPA analysis to evaluate a range of alternative actions, including
a "no action" alternative. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)).
54. Id. at 1513. Specifically, ICL alleged that the Forest Service should have included an
alternative that discussed timber activity in already developed areas and not in the roadless areas. Id.
55. Id. at 1515;see also National Wildlife Fed'n. 497 U.S. at 3185. The Ninth Circuit suggested
a streamlined approach to standing when interpreting N EPA's right to information; any infringement
of that right creates cognizable injury. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1513-14 n.10 (citing
Competitive Enterprise Inst. v. NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Moreover. the court
noted that one commentator has persuasively argued that in cases of statutory review, courts should
look to the underlying statute instead of following an injury in fact test. Id. (citing William A. Fletcher.
The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988)).
56. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1513-14 n.10. "[The] statute defines the duty, it
characterizes the injury and, if not explicitly, implicitly describes those who are entitled to enforce it."
Id. (citing Primate Protection Leaguev. Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72.77 (1991)). Under the APA.
a person "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled
to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702.
57. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1514 (quoting Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel. 806
F.2d 1378, 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy. 841 F.2d
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Wildlife Federation in its application of the specificity and remoteness
criteria to the threatened injury posed by future development. 8 The court
noted that the affidavits could not specifically name the areas that would be
harmed because the Forest Service had yet to decide the specific locations
to develop. 59 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit did not require the plaintiffs
to allege the high degree of imminence that the Supreme Court required
the plaintiffs to allege in National Wildlife Federation, finding that a
threatened harm does not defeat a claim.60
The Forest Service attacked the specificity of ICL's general allega-
tions that stated over 100,000 acres had been denied wilderness status,
questioning ICL's personal interest in the controversy. 1 The court restated
the specificity requirement, requiring a geographical nexus to the site of
the challenged project, and found that ICL established this geographical
nexus. 62 The court distinguished ICL's allegations from the vague affida-
vits in National Wildlife Federation and PETA.63 In National Wildlife
Federation, the plaintiffs alleged that they used locations "in the vicinity"
of lands that would be open to mining; however, most of the lands had
already been opened to mining activities.84 In PETA, the plaintiffs alleged
use of unspecified portions of a large metropolitan area. 5 In contrast, ICL
members named specific areas of use but "[b] ecause no development ha [d]
yet to be authorized, plaintiffs [could not] provide any more detail than
they ha[d]." 16
Recently, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court
continued to curtail its broad interpretation of standing, applying an even
stricter interpretation of injury in fact.17 In Defenders, the plaintiffs
challenged a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior and
the Secretary of Commerce which limited the geographic scope of section
7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to the United States and the
927, 931 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the Ninth Circuit "has long recognized that failure to follow
procedures designed to ensure that the environmental consequences of a project are adequately
evaluated is a sufficient injury in fact to support standing").
58. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1515.
59. Id. at 1517.
60. Id.
61. Id. (relying on National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 889); PETA, 917 F. 2d at 15.
62. Idaho Conservation League, 965 F.2d at 1517. For further discussion of the geographical
nexus requirement, see infra Part IV.
63. Id. at 1516.
64. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 886.
65. PETA, 917 F.2d at 17.
66. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1516.
67. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (splintered opinion). In effect, the Court enunciated the requirements for
non-statutory review, melding the constitutional requirements of standing with the prudential
requirements.
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high seas. 8 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found that the
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing standing."
In Defenders, the majority held that to establish injury in fact,
plaintiffs must establish, inter-alia, that they suffered an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (1) concrete and polarized, and (2)
actual or imminent.70 The Court focused on the imminence of the harm,
requiring specific affidavits showing the imminent harm. The plaintiffs
failed to show that the contested regulation would directly affect one or
more of their members apart from that member's special interest in the
subject of endangered species.7 1 The Court required the plaintiffs to
specify the particular areas that would be harmed. For example, a member
using part of a contiguous ecosystem must establish imminent harm from
damage to the particular area affected by the challenged agency action.7 2
The majority caustically stated that a person does not have standing
merely because he has an interest in studying or seeing endangered animals
anywhere on the globe. 3
The Court also stated that parties seeking to enforce a procedural
requirement must show harm to the procedural interest and to a separate
substantive interest.74 Specifically, a procedural injury invokes standing
68. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2135. The Court quoted Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA which provides
in pertinent part:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary,
insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency... is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result
in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by
the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical.
Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
69. Id. at 2146. Although the ESA contains a citizen suit provision, the majority analyzed the
plaintiffs' claim as though the ESA does not have a citizen suit provision. See Gene R. Nichol, Justice
Scalia. Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1141 (1993).
70. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2136.
71. Id. at 2138-40. The plaintiffs' affidavits described speculative and non-concrete injuries even
though the desire to use or observe an animal species for purely aesthetic reasons is "undeniably a
cognizable interest for the purpose of standing." Id. at 2137 (citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35).
72. Id. at 2139.
73. Id. The nexus requirement originated in taxpayer suits. Flast v. Cohen. 392 U.S. 83. 102
(1968). In Flast, the Supreme Court analyzed the nexus requirement under the zone of interests
component of the prudential restrictions. Id. at 102-03; see also infra Part Ill. To funher confuse the
application of the nexus requirement, the Ninth Circuit applied it to an injury in fact analysis, stating
that:
"[One] who observes or works with a particular animal threatened by a federal
decision" clearly faces "perceptible harm," and one "who observes or works with animals of
a particular species in the very area of the world where that species is threatened by a federal
decision" may plausibly claim such harm, "since some animals that might have been the
subject of his interest will no longer exist."
Didrickson v. United States Dept. of Interior, 982 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Defenders.
112 S. Ct. at 2139-40).
74. Defenders, 112S. Ct. at 2142. "[A] plaintiff.., claiming only harm to his and every citizen's
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only when disregard of the procedure in question could impair a separate
substantive interest. 5 This essentially requires a personal-stake injury in
addition to the procedural injury; a procedural injury alone will not confer
standing.
In dissent, Justices Blackmun and O'Connor stated that the majority
mischaracterized the holding in National Wildlife Federation "as estab-
lishing the general rule that a party claiming injury from environmental
damage must use the area affected by the challenged activity. '76 They
pointed out that the majority failed to recognize that "environmental
injuries ... can cause harm distant from the areas immediately affected by
the challenged action. Environmental destruction may affect animals
travelling over vast geographical ranges. 17 Destruction of one part of an
ecosystem affects other parts of that ecosystem as well as other contiguous
ecosystems. Moreover, in his concurrence to judgment only, Justice
Stevens noted that even though an environmental harm may affect large
areas, the impact of the harm will not fall indiscriminately upon every
citizen. Only those who use the area will feel the alleged harm.7 8
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor also expressed concern over the new
limitation the majority placed on Congress' authority to allow citizen suits
in federal courts for injuries deemed procedural in nature.7 9 The majority's
dismissal of the ESA's citizen suit provision calls into question procedural
statutes and Congress' power to grant citizens the right to sue.80 First, if an
agency's failure to follow its legally mandated process does not establish
standing and therefore precludes judicial review, procedural statutes such
as the APA, NEPA, FLPMA, and NFMA could be rendered meaning-
less. 81 For example, the APA provides judicial review of an interest
protected by a relevant statute. 82 If that statute is purely procedural, and
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and
tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large---does not state an Article 11I case or controversy."
Id. at 2143.
75. Id. at 2142. However, Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment because he found that the
government did not intend section 7(a)(2) to apply to activities in foreign countries. He also found that
the plaintiffs did not lack standing. Although the plaintiffs did not establish actual harm, their injury
was imminent and not speculative. A person with a professional interest in preserving an endangered or
threatened species or its habitat who intends to revisit the area should have standing. Id. at 2147; see
also infra Part IV.
76. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2154.
77. Id. (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986)).
78. Id. at 2148 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735).
79. Id. at 2152.
80. The ESA states that "any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf... to enjoin...
[the] violation of any ... provision of [the Act]." 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
81. But see Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (holding an injury required by Article III may exist solely by
virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing).
82. See 5 U.S.C. § 702.
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procedural injuries do not confer standing, agencies are left with unfet-
tered discretion to ignore their statutory mandates. 8a Additionally, it
would leave the executive branch largely unchecked, and therefore upset
the balance between the three branches of government and defeat the
purpose of separation of powers from which standing derives."
Second, the majority questioned Congress's power to grant citizens
the statutory right to sue.85 Even if Congress drafts legislation granting
citizens the right to sue, Justice Scalia stated those citizens still must meet
the constitutional requirements of standing to gain judicial review."8 In
other words, regardless of what legally protected interests Congress
creates, an injury to a legally protected interest must pass constitutional
muster to gain judicial review. 87 Although Congress has the power to
create legally protected interests, it lacks the power to grant any citizen
harmed by a statute access to the federal judicial system.88
The Defenders decision enhanced the injury in fact requirement that
plaintiffs must satisfy regardless of whether the statute confers a right to
judicial review. Specifically, the Court tightened its interpretation of
"imminent." 89 Affidavits must demonstrate the imminence of injury by
pinpointing the specific location of the alleged harm.90 For example, even if
the affidavits contained facts showing that agency-funded projects
threatened listed species, the affidavits would not satisfy the imminence
definition unless they show how damage to the species would imminently
injure the affiants. 1 Additionally, the majority seems to require that
affidavits allege specific dates when the affiants use the areas. The majority
found that a Defenders member's affidavits were not specific enough
because she had no current plans or tickets to show when she would return
83. See Nichol,supra note 69, at 1144 (noting that legislatively pronounced public rights cannot
provide a basis for standing in the federal courts unless they coincide with the Justice Scalia's views of
concrete injury).
84. Id. at 1160-62.
85. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2136. Scalia reasons that Congress does not have the power to grant
citizens the right to judicial review in cases where the Constitution has not granted the judiciary that
same power. See Nichol, supra note 69, at 1147. However, the Constitution does not delineate what
"cases" and "controversies" include or do not include. In fact, Justice Scalia has written that the "law
of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting... minorities
against impositions of the majority, and excludes them from the even more undemocratic role of
prescribing how the other two branches should function in order to serve the interest of the majority
itself." Scalia, supra note 3, at 894.
86. Nichol, supra note 69, at 1160.
87. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2139; see Nichol, supra note 69. at 1160.
88. See Nichol, supra note 69, at 1160.
89. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2137-40.
90. Id. at 2137-38.
91. Id. at 2138.
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to Sri Lanka.9" Thus, the Supreme Court narrowed its interpretation of
injury in fact, requiring more specificity than ever before.
In 1993, the Ninth Circuit chose not to adopt the Defenders approach
to injury in fact in Seattle Audubon Society v. Espy. 3 The Ninth Circuit
expressly distinguished Defenders and applied a more traditional interpre-
tation of injury in fact.94 In Seattle Audubon Society, citizen groups"
challenged the FEIS issued by the Forest Service and the record of decision
(ROD) issued by the assistant Secretary of Agriculture, which adopted the
Interagency Scientific Committee (ISC) Report as the Forest Service's
spotted owl management plan.9 6
The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff environmental organiza-
tion, Seattle Audubon Society (SAS), had standing and that the decision
was ripe for review.97 The Forest Service claimed that SAS could not
demonstrate actual or imminent injury as required under Defenders,
arguing that Defenders and National Wildlife Federation materially
altered standing requirements. 8 The court distinguished SAS's claim
from the plaintiff's claim in Defenders, on three grounds: 1) SAS
challenged a final agency action; 2) SAS presented specific affidavits
showing that members lived in close proximity to the owl habitat; and 3)
members frequently visited the area for aesthetic and scientific purposes.99
The court conferred standing because "[t] here [did] not appear to be
any dispute over whether further logging in old-growth forests [would]
adversely affect the remaining owl population throughout its range. Thus,
the asserted harm SAS members complain [ed] of [would] occur if logging
[took] place."' 100 The court reiterated that intervening circumstances
92. Id.
93. 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993).
94. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 998 F.2d at 702.
95. Including Seattle Audubon Society, Pilchuck Audubon Society, Washington Environmen-
tal Council, and Washington Native Plants Society.
96. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 998 F.2d at 701. Seattle Audubon Society (SAS) first filed suit
claiming that the Forest Service violated N FMA by failing to prepare a plan for managing spotted owl
habitat on national forests in northern California, Oregon, and Washington. The district court granted
permanent injunctive relief of timber sales in owl habitat pending preparation of an owl management
plan pursuant to NFMA and NEPA. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1092-93
(W.D. Wash. 1991). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v.
Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 298 (9th Cir. 1991). The Forest Service then published an FEIS and in the
subsequent ROD, adopted the ISC's Report and owl management plan. Seattle Audubon Soc',, 998
F.2d at 70 1. SAS then filed this action in district court. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp.
1473 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
97. Seattle Audubon Socy', 998 F.2d at 703 (upholding the district court's decision that the
Forest Service violated NFMA and NEPA by adopting the ISC Report without considering
alternatives and without considering additional information on the status of the owl).
98. Id. at 702.
99. Id. at 703.
100. Id.
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which might prevent logging were not relevant to the standing issue.10'
SAS's injury arose from the Forest Service overlooking environmental
consequences in violation of procedural mandates. The plaintiffs in Idaho
Conservation League asserted the same injury.10° The Ninth Circuit
concluded in Seattle Audubon Society that SAS had standing because:
the threatened harm to owl viability resulting from further
logging in old-growth forests, in the absence of an owl manage-
ment plan which complies with the requirements of NEPA and
the NFMA, is concrete, specific, imminent, caused by agency
conduct in question, and redressable by a favorable ruling.,
The Ninth Circuit did not depart from the recent Supreme Court cases; it
merely distinguished them on their facts.
The Ninth Circuit decided Portland Audubon Society v. Babbitt'"
on the same day it decided Seattle Audubon Society. Following a series of
court actions, 0 5 Portland Audubon Society (PAS) sought declaratory
relief claiming that the BLM violated NEPA by authorizing timber sales
in spotted owl habitat without preparing a new EIS on the effects of logging
on the spotted owl. PAS also sought an injunction to prohibit the BLM
from authorizing any land-altering timber sales in spotted owl habitat.'"
The Ninth Circuit held that PAS had standing and prevailed on the
merits of the case.107 As in Seattle Audubon Society, the government
contended that National Wildlife Federation and Defenders "materially
alter the standing principles which previously applied and that these
Supreme Court decisions require dismissal of plaintiff's challenges."'' 0 8
The Ninth Circuit found the government's contention no more compelling
than in Seattle Audubon Society. 09
101. Id.
102. Id. at 701; Idaho Conservation League. 956 F.2d at 1513.
103. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 998 F.2d at 703.
104. 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993).
105. Portland Audubon Society (PAS) initially sought declaratory and injunctive relief to
protect the habitat of the spotted owl in Oregon and Washington. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan.
712 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Or. 1989) (following remand, 866 F.2d 302. granting BLM's motion for
summary judgment). The Ninth Circuit then affirmed that the NEPA claims were prohibited and
reversed that the group's non-NEPA claims were barred by the doctrine of laches. Portland Audubon
Soc'y v. Lujan, 884 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 494 U.S. 1026
(1990). PAS filed an amended complaint in 1992. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan. 795 F.Supp. 1489
(D.Or. 1992) (granting summary judgment in favor of PAS). The Secretary of the Interior and other
parties appealed. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993).
106. Portland Audubon Soc'y, 998 F.2d at 707.
107. Id. at 707, 709 (affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment and injunction in
favor of PAS).
108. Id. at 707.
109. Id.; Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 998 F.2d at 702 (stating that "[t he Forest Services position is
not well founded.").
19941
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
The court specifically noted that PAS members submitted affidavits
alleging a pattern of continuous use of spotted owl habitat.1 ' Because the
members have used and will continue to use the forests on BLM land and
"[t]he continued viability of the northern spotted owl is tied directly to the
continued existence of the old-growth forests which comprise its habitat,"
PAS demonstrated injury in fact.11' The BLM even admitted that any
further loss of habitat could severely compromise the ability of the owl to
survive as a species."' Therefore, the court reasoned that absent NEPA
compliance, logging will result in loss of habitat, which will harm the
spotted owl and harm PAS members who will no longer be able to study the
owl.1
13
Most recently, in November 1993, in Resources Limited, Inc. v.
Robertson,"4 the Ninth Circuit again distinguished Defenders. The
plaintiffs"15 challenged the adequacy of the Flathead National Forest
Land and Resource Management Plan (Flathead LRMP) and its accom-
panying EIS. They asserted that the Forest Service violated NEPA,
NFMA, and the ESA." 6
In Resources Limited, the Forest Service tried to develop the
Flathead LRMP and EIS to accommodate several threatened and endan-
gered species 1 7 while allowing logging and other uses. The Forest Service
approved the Flathead LRMP and EIS in 1986. The plaintiffs claimed that
the EIS was inadequate and disputed the Forest Service's conclusion that
implementation of the LRMP would not jeopardize the survival of listed
species." 8
The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge
the decision because "[tjo the extent that the Plan pre-determines the
future, it represents a concrete injury that plaintiffs must, at some point,
have standing to challenge.""' The Ninth Circuit limited its analysis to
110. Portland Audubon Socy, 998 F.2d at 708.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1993).
115. Resources Limited, Inc., Swan View Coalition, Inc., Friends of the Wild Swan, and Five
Valleys Audubon Society.
116. Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1396.
117. Including the grizzly bear, gray wolf, bald eagle, and peregrine falcon. Id.
118. Id. at 1397.
119. Id. (quoting Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1516). The district court found that
the Flathead LRMP merely allowed for the possibility of development in the future. Therefore, the
future action was too remote to confer an injury in fact and grant access to the judicial system.
Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 789 F. Supp. 1529, 1533-34 (D.Mont. 1991). The court also held
that NFMA's requirement of economic analysis before clearcutting need not be addressed in the
Flathead LRMP but that an economic analysis can be done any time before implementation of a timber
project. Id.
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injury in fact.120 The court recognized that the LRMP is an important
decision even if it does not represent a site-specific decision, quoting key
language from Idaho Conservation League: "[S]hort of assuming that
congress imposed useless procedural safeguards.... we must conclude that
the management plan plays some, if not a critical, part in subsequent
decisions."' 21 The court further noted that if Resources Limited did not
have standing to sue at this procedural step, the program would forever
escape review."'
The Forest Service claimed that the Supreme Court's recent decisions
in National Wildlife Federation and Defenders do not coincide with the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Idaho Conservation League. 2- However, the
Ninth Circuit had just decided Seattle Audubon Society and Portland
Audubon Society in July of 1993, validating Idaho Conservation League
in light of National Wildlife Federation and Defenders."' In Resources
Limited, the plaintiffs filed affidavits on behalf of individual members
alleging use of the Flathead National Forest on a regular basis. The
intervenor, Intermountain Forest Industry Association, claimed that the
affidavits must specify the particular area of the forest where the injury will
occur. The Ninth Circuit, however, does not require plaintiffs to specify the
exact location of the injury if the agency has not yet determined the
location of the action; therefore, the court conferred standing.125
The court in Resources Limited also rejected the argument that an
injury is hypothetical because it is subject to intervening circumstances.1 26
By expressly dismissing the strict imminence and specificity requirements
of injury in fact, the Ninth Circuit moved further away from the Supreme
Court's approach to injury in fact in Defenders. In Idaho Conservation
League, however, the Ninth Circuit carefully reasoned a lower threshold of
imminence, without explicitly stating why affidavits that depend on
intervening circumstances do not necessarily defeat standing.1 21
B. Causation and Redressability
After a plaintiff has established injury in fact, courts turn to the
120. Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1397.
121. Id. (quoting Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1516).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1397-98.
124. Id. at 1398; see Portland Audubon Soc'y, 998 F.2d 705 and Seattle Audubon So<y. 998
F.2d 699 (denying that Defenders established a new stricter burden to specify an injury in fact).
125. Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1398 (stating that the Ninth Circuit has not imposed a specificity
requirement to point to the precise area where the injury will occur); see Seattle Audubon Sot'y. 998
F.2d at 702-03; Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1516-17.
126. Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1398 (referring to Seattle Audubon Soc*)'. 998 F.2d at 703;
Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1515).
127. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d 1515-17.
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second and third components of the constitutional requirements for
standing: causation and redressability.' 28 These two elements appear
inextricably intertwined, and courts often combine them.'29 The second
component requires that a causal connection exist between the injury and
the defendant's alleged misconduct, or that the injury is fairly traceable to
the action being challenged. 30 The third component requires that the relief
requested will redress the plaintiff's injury.131 Mere speculation fails.' 32
Redressability relies on both injury in fact and causal connection: If an
actual injury does not exist, it would not be redressable. Similarly, if the
causal connection does not exist, the requested relief would not redress the
conduct complained of.
In Allen, the Supreme Court distinguished causation and redres-
sability, acknowledging "that there is a difference, [in] that the former
examines the causal connection between the asserted unlawful conduct
and the alleged injury, whereas the latter examines the causal connection
between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested." 3a In Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, the Supreme Court
required only that the injury be likely to be redressed. 34
In Defenders, the Court stated that "when the plaintiff is not himself
the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is
not precluded, but it is ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to estab-
lish."'3 5 The plaintiffs in Defenders failed to meet the redressability
component for two reasons. First, the Court found that the plaintiffs could
not successfully attack a generalized level of government action but must
wait to challenge separate decisions to fund particular projects. 36 The
Court reasoned that "suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Gov-
ernment violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish
to carry out their legal obligations . . . [are], even when premised on
allegations of several instances of violations of law, . . . rarely if ever
128. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,38,41 (1976); see also TRIBE,
supra note 16, § 3-18.
129. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2140-41 (1992); Idaho Conservation
League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1517 (9th Cir. 1992); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d
705, 708 (9th Cir. 1993).
130. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (commenting that the "terms cannot be
defined so as to make application of the constitutional standing requirement a mechanical exercise").
131. Simon, 426 U.S. at 38; see also Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1517 ("deal [ing]
with the two components together, for they are both 'alike in focusing on the question of causation' ").
132. Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19.
133. Id.
134. 426 U.S. at 38.
135. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2137.
136. Id. at 2140 (holding that programmatic review is rarely appropriate).
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appropriate for federal-court adjudication."1 3 Second, the plaintiffs
named the Secretary of the Interior as a party to the suit but did not name
the implementing agencies. The majority relied on a procedural technical-
ity and found that the Secretary's regulations would not necessarily bind
the funding agencies and therefore, without naming the implementing
agencies, the plaintiffs' injuries were not redressable.13 8
Redressability raises questions similar to those raised by ripeness,
which is perhaps why the majority in Defenders used ripeness language to
analyze the redressability component.139 Unlike the Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit has shied away from combining the two discussions. In
addressing the constitutional component of redressability, the Ninth
Circuit analyzes the underlying statutory scheme. For example, in Idaho
Conservation League, the Ninth Circuit's analysis hinged on the legal
interest Congress intended to protect when enacting NEPA and
NFMA.140 The Forest Service's alleged failure to follow procedural
mandates made possible development that full compliance with procedural
mandates would have denied. The court found that even when the threat of
development depends on third party actions, the procedural safeguards
established by NEPA and NFMA confer an enforceable right at the
LRMP stage." " Short of assuming Congress imposed useless procedural
safeguards, these are the immediate injuries that NEPA and NFMA
aimed to avoid.4
The Ninth Circuit looked to a Seventh Circuit case that ruled in favor
of plaintiffs challenging the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (Commis-
sion) decision not to revoke a permit to construct a plant, even though the
plant could not operate without the Commission granting an operating
permit.1' 3  The court granted standing in light of the risk that the
137. Id. (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 759-60).
138. Id. In the dissent, Justice Blackmun simply "cannot agree [with the majority) that the
Government is free to play 'Three-Card Monte' with its description of agencies' authority to defeat
standing against the agency given the lead in administering a statutory scheme." Id. at 2155.
139. Id. at 2140 (stating that suits challenging a generalized level of government action are
rarely appropriate for federal-court adjudication).
140. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1514 n.12.
141. Id. The court stated:
[I]f the agency action only could be challenged at the site-specific development stage, the
underlying programmatic authorization would forever escape review. To the extent that the
plan pre-determines the future, it represents a concrete injury that plaintiffs must, at some
point, have standing to challenge. That point is now or it is never.
Id. at 1516. Moreover, the administrative procedures for evaluating wilderness recommendations are
separate from the procedures employed to consider site-specific activities. In fact, regulations direct the
Forest Service to evaluate wilderness recommendations during the forest planning process. 36 C.F.R.
§ 219.18 (1993).
142. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1514.
143. Id. at 1516 (analogizing Rockford League of Women Voters v. United States Nuclear
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Commission, faced with a construction permit and a completed plant,
would be "stampeded into granting an operating permit as well. '144
Similarly, the LRMP and wilderness designation signify important deci-
sions with broad-reaching effects. 146
In Idaho Conservation League, the court addressed the traceability
and redressability components together. The Forest Service argued that
ICL's injury failed these tests because the actual development of the
wilderness areas depended on third-party actions. Yet the court focused on
whether ICL's injury was dependent on the Forest Service's policy or on
the result of independent forces governing third-party decisionmaking.
The injury-failure to make wilderness recommendations-would not
have occurred but for the Secretary's decision allegedly made without
following the proper procedures. 1 6 The fact that the development might
never take place did not eliminate the injury that "environmental conse-
quences might be overlooked and reasonable alternatives ignored as a
result of deficiencies in the final EIS and ROD.' 47 The court concluded
that ICL's injury was dependent on the Forest Service's policy and
therefore withstood the traceability and redressability requirements. 48
The Forest Service argued that the threatened injury of development
in roadless areas was too remote for standing purposes because the Forest
Service makes site-specific decisions regarding development after the
LRMP stage and each subsequent decision still requires a NEPA analy-
sis.14 Therefore, the Forest Service argued that the threat of injury was
numerous steps away and each of those steps had inherent procedural
safeguards. However, the court rejected the Forest Service's argument
because an injury that is threatened rather than actual may confer
standing.' 50 The court also stated that even though third parties control the
development and thus the threatened harm, ICL may still establish
standing.' 5'
In Portland Audubon Society, the Ninth Circuit applied a straight-
forward redressability analysis. The plaintiffs drafted artful affidavits and
Regulatory Comm'n, 679 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1982)).
144. Rockford League of Women Voters, 679 F.2d at 1221-22.
145. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1516.
146. Id. at 1517-18.
147. Id. at 1518.
148. Id. The court analyzed the threatened injury of development as a tangent of the procedural
injury; according to the court, the one buttressed the other. The threatened injury could not stand on its
own and pass the imminence of injury in fact. Similarly, the threatened injury buttressed the
redressability requirement for the procedural injury. Id.
149. Id. at 1511.
150. Id. at 1515 (finding "that the potential injury would be the result of a chain of events need
not doom the standing claim").
151. Id.
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requested relief that could redress their injuries. 52 In fact, the BLM and
experts agreed that continued logging without NEPA compliance would
cause harm to the owls and the plaintiffs, who would no longer be able to
observe or study the owls. 153 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit found that the
plaintiffs' "injury-in-fact [was] clearly redressable by the district court's
enjoining the Secretary to comply with the requirements of NEPA."'a
III. PRUDENTIAL RESTRICTIONS
After a court finds that a plaintiff has satisfied the constitutional
requirements, 15 5 it usually turns to the judicially created prudential
restrictions,156 which may require the plaintiff to survive three policy-
based' 57 components before granting standing. "8 Like the constitutional
requirements, the self-imposed prudential restrictions are inconsistent,
leaving to the particular court the decision of whether to apply any one, or
all of them. The guesswork is left to the plaintiffs.
Traditionally, to survive a court's prudential scrutiny, the plaintiff's
injury must fall within the "zone of interests" protected by the relevant
statute159 and involve the plaintiff personally, not as a third party'6 0 nor as a
member of a larger class of potential plaintiffs alleging a "generalized
grievance."' 61 However, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife",' and recent
Ninth Circuit decisions may have changed the manner in which courts
apply these prudential restrictions.
152. Portland Audubon Soc'y, 998 F.2d at 708.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Often courts mention the prudential restrictions, especially the zone of interests test, and
then fail to address those restrictions because the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the constitutional
requirements. In Sierra Club v. Morton, for example, the Supreme Court mentioned the zone of
interests test, but never analyzed it because the plaintiffs failed the threshold injury in fact test. 405
U.S. 727, 733 & n.5 (1972).
156. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Allen v. Wright, characterized the prudential
restrictions as "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction." 468 U.S. 737,751
(1984).
157. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,97 (1968) ("find[ing] their source in policy, rather than
purely constitutional considerations").
158. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,499 (1975) (acknowledging "other limitson the classof
persons who may invoke the courts' decisional and remedial powers"). See generally Fletcher, supra
note 55, at 251-53.
159. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882-83 (1990); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also RIcARo J. PIERCE, JR. E
AL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, § 5.4, at 130 (2d ed. 1992) (noting the Supreme Court's
haphazard application of the zone of interests test).
160. Worth, 422 U.S. at 499.
161. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2145 (1992); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-17 (1974).
162. 112 S. Ct. 2130.
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When courts considered prudential restrictions in the past, they often
focused on the zone of interests component while seldom discussing the
latter restrictions, third-party standing and generalized grievances. This
was especially true in environmental litigation because plaintiffs usually
alleged procedural injuries resulting from a government agency's failure to
follow its statutory guidelines. The Supreme Court initially rendered
prudential restrictions moot where Congress provided a citizen suit
provision that defined a statute's scope of review, or otherwise expressed an
intent to eliminate prudential restrictions through statutory language."' 8
Nonetheless, confused courts would apply prudential restrictions in
situations of both APA and non-APA review.
When a court engages in prudential analysis, it essentially reconsiders
the same concepts as in the constitutional approach.'" The Supreme Court
intimated this in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., where the Burger Court stated that the prudential restrictions
"6are generally satisfied when the constitutional requisites are met."'1 6
A. Zone of Interests
Like the injury in fact component of the interpreted constitutional
requirements, the zone of interests test is threshold. It focuses on the
statute through which plaintiffs seek review of defendant's alleged miscon-
duct. The problem is that the zone of interests test was intended to grant
presumptive review in APA cases only, 16  not to limit court access as a
prudential restriction. 6 7 In Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,"" the Supreme Court first articulated this
prudential restriction while interpreting section 702 of the APA. The
Court defined its attendant query as "whether the interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question."' 69
In determining whether the interest at issue is arguably within a
statute's zone of interest, courts look to the text and structure of "the
163. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 156-57.
164. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON; ADMINISTRATIV LAW 386 n.6 (1993).
165. 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978).
166. See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 394-403 (1987).
167. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 737, 751 (1984) (characterizing the zone of interests test
as a prudential restriction); AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 164, § 12.7.7.
168. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
169. Data processing, 397 U.S. at 153-54. Section 10(a) of the APA provides in pertinent part
that " [a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1988).
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statute whose violation is the gravamen of the complaint." 0  Courts,
however, have also turned to the relevant statute's legislative history,171
because "the reviewability question turns on congressional intent, and all
indicators helpful in discerning that intent must be weighed."'72
Following Data Processing, courts began to mischaracterize the zone
of interests test as an arbitrarily applied prudential restriction.173 The
Supreme Court revisited the zone of interests test in Clarke v. Security
Industry Association,7 4 reiterating its origin yet modifying its future
application. In Clarke, the defendant association of securities brokers
challenged the permission granted by the Comptroller of Currency to two
national banks to establish out-of-state offices as discount brokerage
services. According to the Comptroller's interpretation of the McFadden
Act, the discount brokerage services would not constitute "branches" of
the national banks because none of the branch functions prohibited by the
act would be performed at the discount brokerage services. However, both
the district court and the D.C. Circuit rejected the Comptroller's interpre-
tation. The Comptroller challenged the defendant's standing, arguing that
the defendant associations fell outside the zone of interest of the McFadden
Act, which was intended "to establish competitive equality between state
and national banks.' 7 5
Under a strict interpretation of the zone of interests test, the
Comptroller may have prevailed. The Supreme Court, however, loosely
interpreted the test, holding that the defendant had standing because "the
interest [it] asserts has a plausible relationship to policies underlying [the
act]."97 6 The Court reversed the circuit court's decision, finding that the
banks could open out-of-state brokerage offices in compliance with the act.
The Court summarized the zone of interests test as denying review only
when "the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent
with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be
assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.117 7 The Court in
Clarke went on to stress the test's intended flexibility, saying that "there
need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be
plaintiff."1 78
170. Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Workers Union, 49 US. 517. 529 (1991)
(citing National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 886).
171. See Scanwell Labs, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 865-68 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
172. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400.
173. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982)).
174. 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
175. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 390-93.
176. Id. at 403.
177. Id. at 399.
178. Id. at 399-400.
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A year after the Clarke decision, the Ninth Circuit decided Friends of
the Earth v. United States Navy.179 In Friends of the Earth, the court
determined that the environmental plaintiffs had standing to enjoin the
Navy's proposed construction of a homeport because the Navy failed to
obtain all necessary permits pursuant to the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act (NDAA). In finding that the plaintiffs' alleged injuries fell within
NDAA's zone of interests, the Ninth Circuit relied on Clarke, including
Clarke's distilled explanation of the limited circumstances under which
review should be denied. 180
Two years later in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,1 81 the
Supreme Court found that NWF met the zone of interests test because
Congress designed both FLPMA and NEPA to protect recreational and
aesthetic enjoyment. NWF's affidavits established adverse effects or
aggrievement to recreational and aesthetic interests, and therefore estab-
lished harm within the meaning of the relevant statutes.18 2 However, NWF
failed to show actual harm to these interests." 3
The Ninth Circuit also looks closely to the interests protected by the
relevant statute, perhaps more closely than other courts. Recently, the
Ninth Circuit elaborated on the zone of interests test in Mt. Graham Red
Squirrel v. Espy.'a" In Red Squirrel, the defendant University argued that
the environmental organizations' interests were beyond Congress's in-
tended purpose of the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act (AICA). The court
responded that even if the plaintiffs' interests were inconsistent with
underlying purpose of the AICA, the defendant still must show "that this
inconsistency is so fundamental as to make it impossible to believe that
Congress intended to permit [the plaintiffs] to bring suit."'185 Since
impossibility is an extremely high hurdle for defendants, the circuit court's
broad interpretation of underlying statutes indicates that the zone of
interests test presents less of an obstacle to environmental plaintiffs in the
179. 841 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1988).
180. Friends of the Earth, 841 F.2d at 931-33. The court in Friends of the Earth incorporated
the following language from Clarke in its opinion:
if the plaintiffs interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes
implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit
the suit. The test is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need be no
indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.
Id. at 932 (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399-400).
181. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
182. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 883-86. Because National Wildlife Fed'n involved a
motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court required a more stringent showing of fact than it
requires in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id.
183. Id. at 886-89.
184. 986 F.2d 1568 (9th Cir. 1993).
185. Red Squirrel, 986 F.2d at 1582-83 (emphasis added).
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Ninth Circuit. Congress' failure to expressly state an intent in the AICA to
preclude such suits enabled the court to reject the defendant's argument
and grant the plaintiffs standing. 8 '
Later in 1993, in Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. United States Forest
Service,87 an organization of ranchers who held Forest Service grazing
permits challenged the Toiyabe National Forest LRMP for violating
NEPA and NFMA. The Ninth Circuit noted that the zone of interests test
weeds out suits that "are more likely to frustrate than to further statutory
objectives."' 8 8 The court looked to the purpose of NEPA, which is "to
encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or'eliminate damage to
the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of
man."' 89 Since the ranching organization asserted economic injuries, not
environmental injuries, the court determined that the organization lacked
standing under NEPA. 90
The organization also alleged that the LRMP affected the human
environment which caused its members lifestyle loss. However, the court
held that the organization could not "invoke NEPA to prevent 'lifestyle
loss' when the lifestyle in question is damaging to the environment." 191 The
court never applied the constitutional tests of standing because it found
that the organization was not entitled to judicial review under the APA.192
Thus, Red Squirrel and Nevada Land Action illustrate that while judicial
review is presumptive under the APA, plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit must
still tailor their complaint to the relevant statute under which they seek
review, explaining why their particular interests fall within that statute's
zone of interests.
B. Generalized Grievances
The underlying concept of the generalized grievances restriction is
that plaintiffs must assert their own rights, not those shared with a larger
class of potentially injured plaintiffs nor with the general public.193 While
sometimes couched in prudential terms, this restriction is not unlike the
prohibition on purely ideological plaintiffs often discussed in injury in fact
186. Id. at 1583.
187. 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1993) (presenting an interesting twist because Nevada Land Action is
not an established environmental organization).
188. Nevada Land Action, 8 F.3d at 715 (citing Clarke, 479 U.S. at 397 n.12).
189. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
190. Red Squirrel, 926 F,2d at 715.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974).
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analysis." 4 The similarity is evident in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
where Justice Scalia used the generalized grievances restriction within his
procedural injury analysis to reject plaintiff's claim under the ESA:
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a
generally available grievance about government-claiming only
harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of
the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more
directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large-does not state an Article III case or controversy.19 5
Since Defenders, courts are more apt to discuss the generalized grievances
component when reviewing environmental plaintiffs' standing. This is
largely a reaction to Justice Scalia's use of the generalized grievances
restriction before focusing on the separation of powers, 190 which, according
to the Court in Allen v. Wright, is the inherent "single basic idea" behind
prudential restrictions.197
Justice Scalia has argued that some litigated issues are better left to
the legislative branch of the government, and that prudential restrictions
are the Court's preferred tool of deference.1 8 Following his lead, the
Supreme Court has only recently liberally applied prudential restrictions
to further limit access to the courts for environmental plaintiffs. The Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, has followed the traditional analysis, exercising
conservative use of these restrictions.
However, even before Defenders, courts sometimes mentioned sepa-
ration of powers when discussing generalized grievances.199 Finding a
window of opportunity through which he might implement an agenda,200
Justice Scalia went on to express his separation of powers ideas in
Defenders.2"' Justice Scalia's interpretation, which is arguably dicta,
would essentially eliminate any distinction between APA and non-APA
194. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,474-75,482-87 (1982); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,734-35 (1972).
195. 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2143 (1992).
196. See Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2144-45.
197. 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99 (stating that these "other
limits" were "about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society");
Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 222 (ruling on a claim without injury "would create the potential for abuse of
the judicial process, distort the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the
Legislature and open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing 'government by injunction' ");
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (noting that prudential restrictions "find their source in policy,
rather than purely constitutional considerations").
198. See sources cited supra note 3.
199. See, e.g., Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 222, 226-27.
200. See Scalia, supra note 3; see also Perino, supra note 3, at 149-56, 175-78.
201. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2144-45.
[Vol. 15
WADING THROUGH THE QUAGMIRE
review for courts engaging in standing analyses." 2 To recognize the
distinction, according to Justice Scalia, enables Congress to empower the
individual with a duty explicitly reserved for the executive branch under
Article II's take care clause. 203
While the implications of the Court's decision in Defenders remain
unknown, the Court's generalized grievances discussion may encourage
Congress to opt for more specific language when drafting citizen suit
provisions. Likewise, Defenders should encourage environmental plaintiffs
to be more specific as to their injury when drafting their pleadings, to avoid
"in the vicinity" language, and to individualize their injuries as much as
possible, setting themselves apart from the general populace.
C. Third-Party Standing
The underlying concept of this prudential restriction is that a plaintiff
cannot assert the legal rights of another. 20 ' Before declining to impose this
restriction under the facts in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., the Court justified imposing the third-party standing
restriction "when the rights of third parties are implicated [because it
avoids] the adjudication of rights which those not before the court may not
wish to assert, and the assurance that the most effective advocate of the
rights at issue is present to champion them.20 5
The third-party standing restriction invokes comparison to and
confusion with the broader concepts of zone of interests and injury in fact.
It is like the zone of interests test in that a plaintiff whose interest falls
outside the relevant statute's zone of interests is asserting a claim based on
the rights of others-namely, those whose interests fall within the statute's
zone of interests.20 6 Since the injury in fact must have a close relationship
with the asserted right, third-party standing concepts may also appear in a
court's discussion of injury in fact or nexus.
Likewise, courts draw similarities between third-party standing and
associational standing concepts. In Warth v. Seldin,207 local low-income
residents, taxpayers, organizations to assist low-income residents, and a
202. Id.
203. Id. Article II, section 3 imposes on the President the duty to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
204. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 496, 499 (1975) (holding that "the plaintiffgenerally must
assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interest
of third parties");see also TRIBE, supra note 16, § 3-19 at 134-45. See generally Henry P. Monaghan.
Third Party Standing, 84 COLUNM. L. REv. 277 (1984).
205. 438 U.S. at 80 (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976)).
206. See TRIBE, supra note 16, § 3-19 at 144 (citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at 123 & n.2 (Powell.
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
207. 422 U.S. 490.
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home builders company challenged a town board's zoning ordinance but
were denied standing. In that opinion, the Supreme Court recognized "that
an association may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief
from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the
association itself may enjoy.""'8 The alleged injury to the group suing on its
own behalf, however, must be concrete and demonstrable, alleging more
than a mere abstract organizational interest.20 In UAW v. Brock, the
Court further justified associational standing to sue by acknowledging that
"[b]esides financial resources, organizations often have specialized exper-
tise and research resources relating to the subject matter of the lawsuit that
individual plaintiffs lack."210
In litigation, environmental groups usually assert the interests of their
members in addition to their own interests. Under this approach to
standing, if one member of an association or group meets all applicable
standing requirements, including the threshold requirement of injury in
fact, the association itself has standing-at least, its standing is usually not
challenged. 2" For example, although it ultimately denied standing in
National Wildlife Federation, the Court stated: " We assume, since it has
been uncontested, that the allegedly affected interests set forth in the
affidavits-'recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment'-are sufficiently
related to the purposes of respondent association that respondent meets the
requirements of § 702 if any of its members do."'2 12
Other prongs to the associational standing test exist, however. In Hunt
v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission,2 1 3 the Supreme Court
defined the associational standing test as follows:
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its
members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing
to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of
individual members in the lawsuit.214
The Supreme Court has continued to recognize this form of standing and to
reaffirm its holding in Hunt despite further challenges."'0
In environmental cases, courts usually do not delineate the test as the
208. Warth, 422 U.S. at 511.
209. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
210. 477 U.S. 274,289(1986) (quoting Note, From Net to Sword: Organizational Representa-
tives Litigating Their Members Claims, 1974 U. ILL. L. FORUM, 663, 669).
211. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fedn, 497 U.S. at 885.
212. Id. (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)).
213. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
214. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
215. See, e.g., Brock, 477 U.S. at 281-90.
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Court did in Hunt but rather focus on determining whether an association's
named members have standing.216 This is due in part to (1) the manner in
which environmental groups plead their cases, naming several group
members as plaintiffs in addition to the group itself, and (2) the fact that
the first prong of the associational standing test incorporates the general
standing requirements that everyone seeking standing must meet, includ-
ing the association's named members.
Thus, an environmental organization will not only want to set out its
interests in detail, but to distinguish its interests from those of its individual
members and from those of the public at large. The plaintiff in Animal
Lovers Volunteer Association, Inc. v. Weinberger2 " failed to do this.
Animal Lovers Volunteer Association (ALVA) was a recently organized
group aimed at preventing the inhumane treatment of animals. ALVA
brought suit to enjoin the Navy from eradicating the goat population on
San Clemente Island. Following its injury in fact and zone of interests
analysis,21 8 the Ninth Circuit discussed the abstract nature of ALVA's
claim, taking into consideration ALVA's lack of "longevity and indicia of
commitment. '219 To a relatively young organization, then, "its age or fame
... become highly relevant" factors, worth detailing in its pleadings, but
not nearly as important as "differentiat[ing] its concern ... from the
generalized [concern] of the public. '220
IV. THE NExus REQUIREMENT
The nexus requirement originated in Flast v. Cohen,221 which
involved taxpayer standing and required that the plaintiff establish a
relationship between the injury suffered and the constitutional right on
which the claim is based.2 22 Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has rejected
the argument that the nexus requirement applies universally to all standing
cases.223 Within the taxpayer standing context, courts consider the nexus
requirement to be a constitutional requirement usually discussed within
the injury in fact analysis.224 Beyond that, however, confusion exists as to
216. See, e.g., Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2137-38.
217. 765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1985).
218. The Ninth Circuit found that ALVA failed to satisfy (I) the constitutional injury in fact
requirement because neither ALVA nor members alleged a cognizable injury-aesthetic, economic, or
otherwise, and (2) the zone of interests test because their alleged psychological injury lacked a "direct
sensory impact." Animal Lovers, 765 F.2d 938-39.
219. Id. at 939.
220. Id.
221. 392U.S.83(1968);see United States v. Richardson,418 U.S. 166,170(1974); Linda R.S.
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973); see also TRIBE, supra note 16. § 3-17 at 124-29.
222. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59. 78-79 (1978).
223. See id.; Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War. 418 U.S. 208. 225 (1974).
224. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03; Richardson, 418 U.S. at 174-75; see also TRIBE, supra note
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whether the nexus requirement is a constitutional requirement or a
prudential restriction.225
Since Flast involved standing under the APA, courts have carried the
nexus discussion into that context.226 In Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, for example, the Supreme Court required a "geographical
nexus" between the injured plaintiff and the specific area endangered by
agency action, although the Court couched its discussion in terms of
"actually affected." 227 Not long after, in Idaho Conservation League, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished National Wildlife Federation's specificity
requirement, finding that the plaintiffs satisfied the "geographical nexus"
requirement despite their inability to specify threatened areas because the
proposed development areas had not yet been determined. 2
Even more recently, the Ninth Circuit reconsidered the geographical
relationship between the plaintiffs and the affected area of Alaska in
Didrickson v. Department of the Interior, finding the fact that the
plaintiffs lived in Alaska and frequented the affected areas sufficient. 2 9
While Didrickson involved an APA approach, the court nonetheless briefly
touched on the prudential restriction of generalized grievances when it
stated that the plaintiffs' "interests and those of their members are clearly
of a greater nature than the interest of the general public."28 0
In its discussion of injury in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the
Supreme Court intimated that the nexus requirement can be satisfied by a
direct link between one's demonstrated work with ("vocational nexus") or
interest in an endangered animal ("animal nexus") or habitat ("ecosystem
nexus") and an agency's pending action.2"' The Court stated: "It is clear
that the person who observes or works.with a particular animal threatened
by a federal decision is facing perceptible harm, since the very subject of his
interest will not longer exist. '2 32
The geographical nexus, however, tempers the application of these
"novel standing theories" by requiring that the interested plaintiff estab-
lish a reasonable, direct, and specific connection with the affected area. The
Defenders Court found it unreasonable, for example, that a Bronx Zoo
keeper or patron have "standing to sue because the Director of AID did not
16, § 3-19 at 143-44.
225. See, e.g., Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 79 & n.25; Flast, 392 U.S. at 120, 130-31 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 181, 196 n.18 (Powell, J., concurring).
226. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
227. 497 U.S. 871, 885-89 (1990).
228. 956 F.2d at 1517.
229. Idaho Conservation League, 982 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1992).
230. Didrickson, 982 F.2d at 1341 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,739-40(1972);
Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n, Inc. v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937,939 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)).
231. 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2139-40 (1992).
232. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2139.
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consult with the Secretary regarding the AID-funded project in Sri
Lanka."2 s
While some may characterize the Court's example as dicta, the Ninth
Circuit cited it approvingly in Didrickson as one way to satisfy the "specific
connection" or nexus requirement. 3 In their dissent in Defenders,
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor espoused and advanced the ecosystem
nexus theory, acknowledging that "[m]any environmental injuries...
cause harm distant from the area immediately affected by the challenged
action .... such as rivers running long geographical courses. "235 Likewise,
the dissent impliedly endorsed the "animal nexus" theory in stating that
"[e]nvironmental destruction may affect animals traveling over vast
geographical ranges. 236
For future environmental plaintiffs to employ any of the nexus
theories advanced in Defenders, they must establish an ongoing and direct
link between themselves-as individuals or as a group through economic,
recreational, or scientific injury, and the endangered ecosystem or animal.
The nexus theories may overlap, in that one's vocation may be linked to
either the geographical area or the animal and that one's vocational injury
may be both economic and scientific. All theories should be plead with as
much detail and completeness as possible.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that standing is a complex doctrine, defying
generalizations and analytical structuring. Although there are two ap-
proaches to standing, constitutional requirements and prudential restric-
tions, plaintiffs never know whether the reviewing court will follow a
traditional standing analysis or impose an arbitrary and attenuated
restriction to deny standing. As the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife237 illustrates, courts not only pick and choose what
components to apply but intertwine them, leaving environmental organiza-
tions to plead and prove every component of both the constitutional
requirements and the prudential restrictions. Yet the irreducible minimum
requirements set forth in Allen v. Wright23 8 still provide the core frame-
work to establishing standing. Injury in fact has emerged as a threshold
and seemingly indispensable component. In Defenders, the Supreme Court
233. Id.
234. 982 F.2d at 1340-41.
235. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2154.
236. Id. (citing, for example, Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y. 478 U.S. 221
(1986)).
237. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
238. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
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used the injury in fact to require suffocatingly specific affidavits yet left
open the possibility of using a geographical nexus to establish a direct
connection to an affected area. 29 The Ninth Circuit has since seized the
opportunity to advance the nexus theory.240 Since standing is determined
on a case-by-case, fact-specific basis, environmental organizations should
carefully draft their pleadings, focusing their attention on the irreducible
minimum requirements. The procedural setting will also play an important
role in the determination of the standing issue before either court. The
Ninth Circuit has used the Lujan decision to exercise a lower standard of
specificity for reviewing a motion to dismiss than a motion for summary
judgment.
It is clear that Justice Scalia has led a trend of restraining courts from
granting judicial review to environmental organizations when agency
actions are at issue.241 The Ninth Circuit appears to have minimized the
severity of the Supreme Court's decisions in Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation242 and Defenders by narrowly interpreting those decisions and
broadly interpreting the statute relevant to the claim. The Ninth Circuit
has consistently looked to the interests that the relevant statute aims to
protect. 4a In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit has carefully side-stepped
restricting judicial review for environmental organizations challenging
agency actions.
239. 112 S. Ct. at 2138, 2139.
240. Didrickson v. Department of the Interior, 982 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1992).
241. See sources cited supra note 3.
242. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
243. See Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, 8 F.3d 713, 715 (9th Cir.
1993); Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1568, 1582-83 (9th Cir. 1993); Idaho Conservation
League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1516 (9th Cir. 1992).
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The University of Montana School of Law Career Services
Office
The University of Montana School of Law currently offers career
services to students, graduates, and employers. We welcome and en-
courage employers to use the Law School's Career Services Office. We
offer a full range of services to employers to assist them in locating
qualified applicants for positions such as summer interns, clerks, and
associates. Students have access to resources, workshops, and on-cam-
pus interview programs through the Career Services Office.
Many employers conduct interviews at the Law School, and are
thus able to interview a relatively large number of students in a short
amount of time. We are pleased to make interview rooms at the Law
School available to you, at any time, for interviews. We offer two On
Campus Interview Programs, one in the Fall, the other in the Spring.
Employers are encouraged to visit with faculty to discuss special needs
and learn more about the legal education students receive at The Univer-
sity of Montana School of Law.
For those employers choosing not to interview at the Law School,
we will post job notices on our job boards, which are centrally located in
the school, and collect application materials. If applicable, we will mail
notices to our alumni mailing list (attorneys seeking employment).
For more information please contact Christine Sopko, our Career
Services Coordinator, at, School of Law, University of Montana, Mis-
soula, MT 59812 (406-243-5598).

